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CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES: 
HOW MANY CELL PHONE 
LOCATION POINTS CONSTITUTE A 
SEARCH UNDER THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT? 
DOUGLAS HARRIS* 
INTRODUCTION 
Did you know that cell-phone service providers collect and store 
your location data every time you place or receive a phone call? Your 
answer to this question may impact how the Supreme Court views the 
warrantless search and seizure of cell phone records, including the 
location and movement of the user, under current Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
Using a cell phone would not be possible without the existence of 
cell towers or “cell sites.”1 Cell phones have to connect to nearby cell 
towers with the best signal to access the cellular network and make a 
call.2 Cellular service providers record which cell sites are used when a 
customer starts and ends a phone call, thereby creating cell site 
location information (“CSLI”).3 “The precision of a cell phone user’s 
location reflected in CSLI records depends on the size of the cell site 
‘sectors’ in the area”; when there are more antennas on the cell site, 
there are more sectors.4 Areas with the most cell sites and the smallest 
sectors, like urban metropolitan areas, make the CSLI data pertaining 
to a user’s potential location within the sector more accurate.5 
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 1.  Brief for Petitioner at 14, Carpenter v. United States, 2017 WL 3575179 (2017) (No. 
16-402) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].  
 2.  Id.; see also Brief for Respondent at 10, Carpenter v. United States, 2017 WL 4311113 
(2017) (No. 16-402) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].  
 3.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 14. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. at 14−15. 
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In Carpenter v. United States,6 the Supreme Court must decide 
whether the government’s acquisition of a suspect’s CSLI records 
during an ongoing criminal investigation is a “search” under the 
Fourth Amendment, and thus requires a showing of probable cause to 
obtain a warrant. Petitioner, Timothy Carpenter, used his cell phone 
before and after robbing multiple stores in the Detroit area.7 Cell sites 
covered areas in Detroit ranging from half a mile to two miles.8 When 
assessing whether the government was legally entitled to gather his 
CSLI records, the Court must account for a 1986 statute, the Stored 
Communications Act.9 The statute carves out an exception for 
accessing such records—the governmental entity must only show 
“reasonable grounds” during an ongoing criminal investigation to 
obtain a court order.10 The Court must rely on various tests 
concerning business records, property-based analyses, and reasonable 
expectations of privacy to come to a decision. Thus, the Court’s 
opinion may hinge on a reasonable person’s answer to the question 
opening this Commentary. 
Although this opinion will have future consequences for 
Americans and their privacy interests as cell sites continue to be built 
and CSLI records increasingly contain more private information,11 
this Commentary argues that the necessity of owning and using cell 
phones renders past tests obsolete. With wavering, subjective 
expectations of what information is actually private in society today, 
the Court should thus create a new test that makes a prescriptive 
claim about expectations of privacy and compares newer technologies 
with older ones. The Court should then hold that obtaining CSLI 
records without a warrant is an unreasonable search under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
I. FACTS 
Petitioner, Timothy Carpenter, was convicted of committing a 
series of armed robberies at several Radio Shack and T-Mobile stores 
throughout Michigan and Ohio from December 2010 to March 2011.12 
 
 6.  137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017). 
 7.  United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 885 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012). 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 15.  
 12.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 13. 
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In April 2011, police arrested four individuals involved in the crimes.13 
One of the individuals confessed that he was a part of a group of 
fifteen men—“a shifting ensemble of . . . getaway drivers and 
lookouts”—that robbed nine stores.14 The confessor gave the FBI all 
participants’ cellphone numbers.15 
In May and June 2011, the FBI submitted three orders to 
magistrate judges for “transactional records” from wireless cellphone 
carriers for sixteen different phone numbers.16 In addition to a list of 
numbers called and received, the FBI requested “cell site information 
for the target telephones at call origination and at call termination for 
incoming and outcoming calls” beginning on December 1, 2010.17 The 
FBI stated that these records would provide evidence that Petitioner 
and others violated the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951.18 The magistrates 
granted the requests pursuant to the Stored Communications Act,19 
which allows courts to issue orders when “the governmental entity 
offers specific and articulable facts showing that the contents of a wire 
or electronic communication, or the records or other information 
sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation.”20 MetroPCS turned over 127 days of cell-site records21 
including 186 pages of Carpenter’s cell phone records showing the cell 
site and sector at the start and end of his phone calls.22 
Although MetroPCS was Petitioner’s primary provider, the 
company did not have coverage in one of the areas the charged 
robberies took place.23 When Petitioner was in that area, his phone 
began to use Sprint’s cell towers since MetroPCS had a roaming 
agreement with Sprint that increased MetroPCS customers’ coverage 
 
 13.  United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 884 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 
2211 (2017). 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id.  
 17.  Id.  
 18.  Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012) (“Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, 
or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery 
or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any 
person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.”) . 
 19.  18 U.S.C. § 2703. 
 20.  Id. § 2703(d); Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 884.  
 21.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 14. 
 22.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 19.  
 23.  Id. at 20. 
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area.24 Sprint thus provided two days of cell site location 
information.25 In total, the government accessed 12,898 CSLI data 
points, an average of 101 points per day.26 
Petitioner was charged with counts of aiding and abetting robbery 
that affected interstate commerce in violation of the Hobbs Act, and 
aiding and abetting the use or carrying of a firearm during a federal 
crime of violence.27 Before trial, Petitioner moved to suppress the 
CSLI records “on the basis that the Fourth Amendment prohibits 
their acquisition without probable cause and a warrant.”28 The 
Eastern Michigan District Court denied Petitioner’s motion to 
suppress the government’s cell-site evidence because “people do not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI records—and, 
consequently, their acquisition by the government does not constitute 
a ‘search’ under the Fourth Amendment.”29 
At trial, seven accomplices testified that Petitioner organized most 
of the robberies, supplied the guns, and served as a lookout.30 As an 
expert witness, an FBI agent testified about the cell-site data and how 
cell sites in Detroit individually cover areas ranging from a half-mile 
to two miles.31 The agent created maps showcasing how Petitioner’s 
phone was “within a half-mile to two miles of the location of each of 
the robberies around the time the robberies happened,” placing him 
near the scene of each crime.32 
Petitioner was convicted by a jury on all of the Hobbs Act counts 
and all but one of the gun counts.33 He was sentenced to 116 years and 
4 months imprisonment.34 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s decision, relying on United States v. Jones,35 where five Justices 
agreed that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding 
“longer term GPS monitoring in government investigations of most 
 
 24.  See id. 
 25.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 15. 
 26.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 21. 
 27.  United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 884 (6th Cir. 2016).  
 28.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 21. 
 29.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 21. 
 30.  Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 884.  
 31.  Id. at 885.  
 32.  Id.  
 33.  Id.  
 34.  See id. (“Carpenter’s convictions on the § 924(c) counts subjected him to four 
mandatory-minimum prison sentences of 25 years, each to be served consecutively, leaving him 
with a Sentencing Guidelines range of 1,395 to 1,428 months’ imprisonment.”). 
 35.  565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
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offenses.”36 The Sixth Circuit distinguished CSLI data from GPS 
monitoring, held that individuals do not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy with CSLI data,37 and further held that this 
type of collection of business records is not a “search” under the 
Fourth Amendment.38 Carpenter’s petition for a writ of certiorari 
from the Supreme Court of the United States was granted on June 5, 
2017.39 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Fourth Amendment affords individuals a constitutional right 
to privacy: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause . . . .”40 Although the Fourth Amendment was 
originally interpreted to protect citizens from government intrusion 
into homes,41 it now “protects people, not places.”42 This wider 
conception of the Fourth Amendment not limited to physical 
intrusions came with a “twofold requirement” test: (1) the person 
must have an actual, subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) “the 
expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”43 Although Justice Harlan formed this test in his 
concurring opinion in Katz v. United States,44 the Court has applied his 
analysis to later cases.45 
In Katz, the Supreme Court held that FBI agents must show 
probable cause to obtain a warrant for attaching an electronic 
recording device to a public telephone booth.46 In Justice Harlan’s 
analysis, the crucial fact was that a person speaking inside a closed 
phone booth reasonably assumes that his call is not being 
 
 36.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 22−23 (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., 
concurring)).  
 37.  Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 888.  
 38.  Id. at 890.  
 39.  Carpenter v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017). 
 40.  See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 41.  Jones, 565 U.S. at 405 (“Consistent with this understanding, our Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass, at least until the latter half of the 20th 
century.”). 
 42.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. at 360.  
 45.  Jones, 565 U.S. at 405−06 (citing Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000); California 
v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)). 
 46.  See Katz, 389 U.S. at 355−59. 
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intercepted.47 Twelve years later in Smith v. Maryland,48 the Court 
considered whether a warrant was required for the police to request a 
telephone company to install a pen register at an individual’s office.49 
The pen register would record which numbers were dialed from the 
individual’s home.50 The Court applied the Katz analysis, stating that 
telephone users do not have “any actual expectation of privacy in the 
numbers they dial” because people must “convey phone numbers to 
the telephone company” to complete the calls.51 The Court continued 
by stating that “[a]ll subscribers realize . . . that the phone company . . . 
make[s] permanent records of the numbers they dial.”52 For the 
second part of the test, the Court held that a person has “no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns 
over to third parties.”53 Nonetheless, the Court maintained that the 
content of the phone call—the words spoken during the 
conversation—was private.54 
Forty-five years after Katz, in United States v. Jones,55 the Court 
held that the government’s attachment of a GPS device on a citizen’s 
vehicle to monitor its movements was a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment.56 However, Justice Scalia, in writing for the majority, did 
not apply the Katz test because “Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do 
not rise or fall with the Katz formulation.”57 Instead, the majority 
relied on a textual analysis of the Fourth Amendment with an 
individual’s vehicle being an “effect,” a term listed along with persons, 
houses, and papers.58 The majority’s recapitulation of Harlan’s 
 
 47.  Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 48.  442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 49.  Id. at 737.  
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. at 742 (quotations omitted). 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 743−44 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442−44 (1976); Couch v. 
United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335−36 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) 
(plurality opinion); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 
U.S. 427 (1963)). 
 54.  See id. at 743 (“Although petitioner’s conduct may have been calculated to keep the 
contents of his conversation private, his conduct was not and could not have been calculated to 
preserve the privacy of the number he dialed.”). 
 55.  565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 56.  Id. at 404. 
 57.  Id. at 406. 
 58.  See id. at 404 (“It is beyond dispute that a vehicle is an ‘effect’ as that term is used in 
the Amendment.”). 
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standard from Katz was that it should be used in “add[ition] to, not 
substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”59 
In United States v. Miller,60 the Court reiterated that it  
held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the 
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by 
him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed 
on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose 
and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.61 
This voluntary disclosure of information to third parties diminishes 
the individual’s expectation of privacy, even in the context of a 
governmental entity obtaining a person’s bank records.62 The bank 
records were not “private papers” but were the bank’s business 
records.63 Accordingly, “the depositor takes the risk, in revealing his 
affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that 
person to the Government.”64 
In addition to addressing the precedential impact of these cases, 
Carpenter will likely address the Stored Communications Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 2703, which states in relevant part that “[a] governmental 
entity may require a provider of electronic communication service or 
remote computing service to disclose a record or other information 
pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not 
including the contents of communications) only when the 
governmental entity” obtains a warrant or a court order.65 Although a 
warrant requires probable cause,66 the statute allows a court order for 
disclosure “when the governmental entity offers specific and 
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the 
records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an 
ongoing criminal investigation.”67 Thus, the statute allows a 
“reasonable grounds” standard for accessing certain records from a 
telephone company. The Stored Communications Act became 
 
 59.  Id. at 409; see also id. at 414 (“[T]he trespassory test applied in the majority’s opinion 
reflects an irreducible constitutional minimum: When the government physically invades 
personal property to gather information, a search occurs.”). 
 60.  425 U.S. 435 (1976).  
 61.  Id. at 443.  
 62.  Id. at 442. 
 63.  Id. at 440. 
 64.  Id. at 443. 
 65.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2012). 
 66.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d). 
 67.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
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effective in 1986, a time where communications records were never as 
comprehensive as they are today. 
III. HOLDING 
In Carpenter, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, 
holding that the government’s collection of CSLI as a request for 
business records was not a Fourth Amendment search.68 The court 
began its analysis with a brief history of the Fourth Amendment, 
discussing its historical expansion from a “property-based 
understanding” to “protect[ing] certain expectations of privacy as 
well,”69 and the creation of the Katz test to determine what is a 
“search.”70 Then, the court focused on the content-context distinction 
that further guides the analysis.71 In Katz, the police could not surveil 
the content of the conversation taking place in the phone booth 
without a warrant, nor could the police listen to the conversations in 
Smith.72 However, the caller in Smith could not expect the context of 
his conversation—the phone numbers he dialed—to remain private.73 
Although the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the content of emails 
are still protected, courts have not extended the same protection to 
metadata used in sending these internet communications, “like sender 
and recipient addresses on an email, or IP addresses.”74 
Based on this precedent, the court found that “the business 
records here fall on the unprotected side of this line” because CSLI 
data helped facilitate the personal communications and did not 
include the actual content of the communications.75 Using Smith, the 
court reasoned that cellphone users knew, during a call, they were 
 
 68.  United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 890 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 69.  Id. at 886. 
 70.  Id.  
 71.  See id. at 883 (“In Fourth Amendment cases the Supreme Court has long recognized a 
distinction between the content of a communication and the information necessary to convey 
it.”). 
 72.  Id. at 887. 
 73.  See id. (“But in Smith, the Court held that the police’s installation of a pen register—a 
device that tracked the phone numbers a person dialed from his home phone—was not a search 
because the caller could not reasonably expect those numbers to remain private. ‘Although [the 
caller’s] conduct may have been calculated to keep the contents of his conversation private, his 
conduct was not and could not have been calculated to preserve the privacy of the number he 
dialed.’”) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979)).  
 74.  See id. (citing United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 574 (3d Cir. 2010); United States 
v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204–05 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 
(9th Cir. 2007)).  
 75.  Id. 
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exposing their location to the nearest cell tower and its respective 
company because these users saw their “phone[s’] signal strength 
fluctuate.”76 Additionally, anyone that paid cellphone charges should 
have expected that these phone companies recorded locational 
information for “legitimate business purposes.”77 When the Sixth 
Circuit applied the test from Katz, the court emphasized language 
from Smith: “it is important to begin by specifying precisely the nature 
of the state activity that is challenged.”78 Because the nature of the 
activity is obtaining business records from a third party, these 
defendants had a diminished expectation of privacy for the related 
information.79 
The Sixth Circuit paid great deference to the legislative intent of 
the Stored Communication Act, explaining that “[t]he act strikes out a 
middle ground between full Fourth Amendment protection and no 
protection at all” with its “reasonable grounds” requirement.80 This 
middle ground was constitutional because the second part of the Katz 
test asks if the expectation of privacy “is one that society is prepared 
to recognize as reasonable”81 and society, in the form of elected 
legislators, has “struck a balance that it thinks is reasonable.”82 The 
majority opinion finally acknowledged the exponential speed at which 
technology advances,83 thus making Congress the better body of 
government to deal with these types of issues. 
The Sixth Circuit supplemented their analysis by comparing the 
case to Jones, repeating that the attachment of a GPS device did not 
concern business records and, thus, deals with a different legal 
question.84 But the court still distinguished the facts at hand from 
Jones, since CSLI is not as accurate as GPS information.85 GPS data 
was accurate within fifty feet but the locational data here was 
 
 76.  See id. at 888. 
 77.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 78.  Id. (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 741) (emphasis in original). 
 79.  Id. at 888−89. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 889−90 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)). 
 82.  Id. at 890. 
 83.  See id. (“But sometimes new technologies—say, the latest iterations of smartphones or 
social media—evolve at rates more common to superbugs than to large mammals. In those 
situations judges are less good at evaluating the empirical assumptions that underlie their 
constitutional judgments.”). 
 84.  See id. at 889 (“That sort of government intrusion presents one set of Fourth 
Amendment questions; government collection of business records presents another. And the 
question presented here, as shown above, is answered by Smith.”). 
 85.  Id. 
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“accurate within a 3.5 million square-foot to 100 million square-foot 
area.”86 The court was also careful to say that Petitioner “lack[ed] any 
property interest in cell-site records created and maintained by their 
wireless carriers.”87 
Conversely, Judge Stranch’s concurrence asserted that 
approaching the case by focusing on how the information is 
voluntarily disclosed to third parties “is ill suited to the digital age, in 
which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to 
third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”88 Judge 
Stranch conceded that CSLI data was less precise than GPS tracking 
but used United States v. Skinner89 to assert her concern that “long-
term location monitoring in government investigations impinges on 
expectations of privacy.”90 The court in Skinner held that the 
“defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
GPS data and the location of his cellphone” when DEA agents 
tracked him over three days.91 Judge Stranch was worried that this 
case reached the territory Justice Alito warned about in Jones: “there 
may be situations where police, using otherwise legal methods, so 
comprehensively track a person’s activities that the very 
comprehensiveness of the tracking is unreasonable for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.” The tracking here exceeded Skinner by 
collecting four months of CSLI data.92 Judge Stranch argued that the 
existing tests make the business records containing CSLI data akin to 
business records containing credit card purchases, which do not reflect 
personal location to the same degree.93 Thus, Judge Stranch believed 
this type of treatment showed the need for a new test.94 
 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 888. 
 88.  Id. at 894 (Stranch, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 
(2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).  
 89.  690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012).  
 90.  Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 895. 
 91.  United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780−81 (6th Cir. 2012).  
 92.  Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 895. 
 93.  See id. at 889 (“In light of the personal tracking concerns articulated in our precedent, 
I am not convinced that the situation before us can be addressed appropriately with a test 
primarily used to obtain business records such as credit card purchases—records that do not 
necessarily reflect personal location.”). 
 94.  Id. at 896. 
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IV. ARGUMENTS 
In Carpenter, Petitioner and the United States disagree about 
whether the collection of CSLI data pursuant to the Stored Collection 
Act is constitutional. Namely, the issue is whether a governmental 
entity can obtain a court order for such information without showing 
probable cause. 
A. Petitioner’s Arguments 
Petitioner’s arguments are grounded in the privacy concern that 
allowing this warrantless access of CSLI data will result in the 
government’s ability to use this tool to access any citizen’s minute-by-
minute location.95 Petitioner’s conclusion is supported by (1) using the 
Katz test in union with the similar facts in Jones to state that 
Petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy with the CSLI 
records, (2) supplementing the property-based analysis in using 
another relevant congressional statute, and (3) downplaying the thrust 
of the third-party/business records doctrine. 
First, Petitioner argued that individuals have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy with their longer-term cellular location records 
under the Katz test. Petitioner used language from Jones in his 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy calculus, accounting for the 
expectation of privacy against the government prior to the creation of 
the new technology.96 As people expect the government to not 
secretly monitor the movement of their vehicles, they also expect the 
same privacy with their longer-term cell phone location records 
because cell phones are carried almost everywhere people go.97 
Therefore, before the advent of cell-phones, the government could not 
intimately track individuals in this manner.98 Petitioner bolstered his 
claim of confidentiality with the federal Telecommunications Act, 47 
U.S.C. § 222(c)(1), which declared that cell phone providers cannot 
disclose location data without “approval of the customer.”99 
Petitioner’s worry is exacerbated with future technological 
advancements likely narrowing the location accuracy gap between 
 
 95.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 30. 
 96.  See id. at 30−31 (“[T]his Court has stressed that the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy 
inquiry must ‘assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed’ 
prior to the advent of the new technology in question.”) (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 
U.S. 400, 406 (2012)).  
 97.  Id. at 32−34. 
 98.  Id. at 35−36. 
 99.  Id. at 40−41.  
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GPS and CSLI, especially with more cell sites being constructed in 
dense areas.100 Furthermore, CSLI records are expanding and 
becoming more plentiful in conjunction with cellular service providers 
collecting and retaining location information when an individual 
checks a text message, sends an email, and uses apps.101 
Second, Petitioner used a property-based analysis to argue that 
CSLI records constitute protected “papers” under the Fourth 
Amendment because CSLI data is rendered as “customary 
proprietary network information” under the federal 
Telecommunications Act;102 this information cannot be disclosed 
“without the express prior authorization of the customer.”103 
Accordingly, the statute made CSLI a proprietary interest of the 
customer as a “paper” or “effect” and therefore, the data is owned by 
the customer and not the carrier.104 
Last, Petitioner argued that the premise of the third-party 
doctrine, the idea that disclosing information to a third party 
necessarily ensures that the individual cannot reasonably expect the 
information to be private, is merely a factor to be considered and not 
a dispositive test.105 The petitioner claimed that this principle, 
combined with the recognition that the Fourth Amendment must 
account for new technology, effectively resolves this case.106 Therefore, 
by showing a reasonable expectation of privacy and that this 
disclosure is a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, the 
Government must show probable cause to obtain a warrant for CSLI 
records.107 
B. The Government’s Arguments 
In response to Petitioner’s argument about third-party disclosure 
and reasonable expectation of privacy, the Government first argued 
that Petitioner cannot claim a privacy interest in CSLI records that he 
 
 100.  Id. at 44−45. 
 101.  Id. at 51. 
 102.  Id. at 57. 
 103.  47 U.S.C. § 222(f) (2012). 
 104.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 59. 
 105.  See id. at 74 (“Although it may someday be necessary to ‘reconsider the premise’ of 
the third-party doctrine, it is not necessary in this case to reassess its continued validity in every 
possible context. Properly understood, the disclosure of information to a third party is but one 
factor in determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists.”) (quoting United 
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).  
 106.  Id. at 74−75.  
 107.  Id. at 92. 
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voluntarily disclosed to his cell-service providers.108 The Government 
relied upon Smith’s strong language that “[t]his Court consistently has 
held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
information he voluntary turns over to third parties.”109 Petitioner, 
too, cannot have any subjective expectation of privacy of this 
information because Miller established that one “can assert neither 
ownership nor possession” of cell-site records110 and cell phone users 
generally understand that their phones must communicate with cell 
towers to make and receive calls.111 Additionally, cell-phone users 
cannot have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy with 
voluntarily disclosed information to third parties.112 
In relation to Jones, the Government argued that, unlike attaching 
a GPS device to a vehicle, the Government did not intrude on 
Petitioner’s privacy interests by recording the cell towers used to 
make his phone calls.113 The phone companies created these records 
for their own business purposes.114 
In response to Petitioner’s claim that the third-party doctrine is 
not necessarily dispositive when it involves highly sensitive 
information, the Government worried about “intractable line-drawing 
problems.”115 Pragmatically, the Government finds it problematic that 
Petitioner did not provide a framework for defining what is 
sufficiently sensitive information.116 Nevertheless, investigators could 
not even apply this hypothetical standard about sensitivity until they 
take the first step: accessing the records.117 
The Government argued that this collection of CSLI records 
failed the property-based analysis since Petitioner “did not create 
those records and has no right to control their content.”118 Nor could a 
property interest be grounded in 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(1) since the 
statute also permits disclosure “as required by law”—which it is under 
the Stored Communications Act.119 
 
 108.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 28.  
 109.  Id. (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743−44 (1979)). 
 110.  Id. at 33−34 (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976)).  
 111.  Id. at 34. 
 112.  Id. at 37−38. 
 113.  Id. at 54−59. 
 114.  Id. at 59. 
 115.  Id. at 49. 
 116.  Id. at 49−50. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. at 68. 
 119.  Id. at 69−70. 
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The Government also rejected Petitioner’s reliance on 47 U.S.C. § 
222(c)(1) for calculating an asserted expectation of privacy when the 
Court previously rejected the suggestion that “the Amendment was 
intended to incorporate subsequently enacted statutes.”120 
Moreover, the Government rejected Petitioner’s claim about these 
records “leav[ing] all such data beyond constitutional control, making 
it possible for the government to collect all Americans’ cell-site data 
for all time” because the Fourth Amendment still protects business 
records in terms of “arbitrariness, overbreadth, and 
burdensomeness.”121 Here, the collection of records before and after 
the unsolved crime was not arbitrary.122 Since there can be other 
reasons for Petitioner to be in that area, the several weeks of data can 
help distinguish which location points are actually relevant.123 
In response to Petitioner’s claims that CSLI will become more 
precise over time with future technology, the Government suggested 
that this claim is without merit by providing a hypothetical instance 
where this would not occur: “[f]or example, device-to-device 
technology could reduce the need for cell towers, preventing 
providers from collecting or recording location information.”124 
Lastly, the Government argued that even if the collection of 
business records was a search under the Fourth Amendment, it 
remained constitutionally reasonable125 because cases have 
established that governmental entities can acquire documents via 
subpoena when Congress authorizes the investigation.126 The 
Government also recognized how certain investigations require 
subpoenas of this nature because “the very purpose of requesting the 
information is to ascertain whether probable cause exists.”127 The 
Government believed the Sixth Circuit correctly held that this 
warrantless procurement of Petitioner’s CSLI records complied with 
the Fourth Amendment.128 
 
 120.  Id. at 40 (quoting Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 169 n.3 (2008)). 
 121.  Id. at 63. 
 122.  Id. at 64−65.  
 123.  Id. at 65. 
 124.  Id. at 45 (citation omitted). 
 125.  Id. at 70. 
 126.  Id. at 72−73 (citing Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946)); see 
Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 415 (1984). 
 127.  Id. at 75 (quoting United States v. R. Enters, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991)). 
 128.  Id. at 90. 
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V. ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court should reverse the judgment of the Sixth 
Circuit and hold that accessing CSLI data for an extended period is a 
“search” under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the government must 
show probable cause to obtain a warrant for accessing Petitioner’s 
longer-term CSLI records. 
With the need to have a cell phone to be a productive member of 
society129 and the impracticability of living “off the grid,” American 
citizens necessarily have to disclose information to third parties like 
cellular providers. It does not follow that individuals have to sacrifice 
any privacy rights or Fourth Amendment protections by owning a cell 
phone—a device that can enable citizens to be tracked by 
governmental agencies in unprecedented ways. Chief Justice Roberts 
has even gone so far as to say that cell phones “are now such a 
pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor 
from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human 
anatomy.”130 Therefore, the Court should hold that voluntarily 
disclosing information to a third party in this manner does not imply 
that an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
pertaining to that information. The Court should not refer to CSLI 
data under the façade of being “business records” to downplay an 
individual’s right to privacy like the Court has done in the past with 
credit card records.131 
The true hardship lies in Carpenter’s line-drawing inquiry—at 
what point does accessing CSLI records become a search under the 
Fourth Amendment, thereby requiring a governmental entity to show 
probable cause to obtain a search warrant? Although access to a few 
location points is not a per se search,132 accessing thousands of 
 
 129.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 75 (“In our time, unless a person is willing to 
live ‘off the grid,’ it is nearly impossible to avoid disclosing the most personal of information to 
third-party service providers on a constant basis, just to navigate daily life.”) (quoting United 
States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 525 (11th Cir. 2015) (Rosenbaum, J., concurring)). 
 130.  Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014). 
 131.  United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 895 (6th Cir. 2016) (Stranch, J., concurring) 
(“In light of the personal tracking concerns articulated in our precedent, I am not convinced 
that the situation before us can be addressed appropriately with a test primarily used to obtain 
business records such as credit card purchases—records that do not necessarily reflect personal 
location.”). 
 132.  Petitioner concedes that there is some period of time where the Government can 
access a person’s CSLI free from Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 
1, at 53. 
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location points undoubtedly becomes a search. The existing tests are 
not suitable to handle this legal question. 
Treating CSLI data as business records undermines the 
comprehensive location data involved and does not help draw 
territorial lines of what constitutes a search.133 The reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test created in Katz is similarly limited when 
treating CSLI as mere business records. Even if the Katz inquiry 
treated cell phones and their CSLI as pieces of property, it is difficult 
for society to reasonably regard CSLI records as private information 
when the government and other third parties continuously gain access 
to what was once perceived as private information. Society does not 
have to look any further than the WikiLeaks documents about the 
NSA’s capabilities134 and by viewing personalized advertisements 
when scrolling Facebook that are based on past internet search 
results135 to understand that third parties can create comprehensive 
pictures of us based on our daily habits. Allowing the Government to 
procure CSLI records without a warrant would essentially allow the 
government to watch us walk through this world. So, although 
Americans should have an expectation of privacy with collected 
information embedded in newer technologies, we do not. 
The Sixth Circuit’s content/context distinction, too, blurs the line 
separating searches from non-searches. The test should have to 
delineate the type of data (CSLI pertaining to incoming/outcoming 
calls, text messages, emails, apps, etc.) and amount of data that 
constitutes a search—thus incorporating future changes in technology 
when CSLI becomes more precise. 
Although the Court should undoubtedly recognize that Carpenter 
bears enough resemblance to Jones to constitute a search, courts will 
run into similar issues with future cases where a new technology 
opens the door for the government to collect data on individuals. 
Thus, Carpenter, as Judge Stranch suggests, calls for the Court to 
create a new test altogether to handle the situations where “police, 
using otherwise legal methods, so comprehensively track a person’s 
 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  See Craig Timberg, Elizabeth Dwoskin & Ellen Nakashima, WikiLeaks: The CIA is 
Using Popular TVs, Smartphones and Cars to Spy on their Owners, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/03/07/why-the-cia-is-using-your-tvs-
smartphones-and-cars-for-spying/?utm_term=.f590dcbadbb7. 
 135.  See Noam Scheiber, Facebook’s Ad-Targeting Problem, Captured in a Literal Shade of 
Gray, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/28/technology/facebook-
ads.html. 
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activities that the very comprehensiveness of the tracking is 
unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.”136 Although 
precedent is limited by its current landscape, technology continues to 
grow at an unprecedented rate—changing how society lives and views 
privacy as a whole. “[O]ur precedent suggests the need to develop a 
new test to determine when a warrant may be necessary under these 
or comparable circumstances.”137 
Accessing business records should be treated the same way as if a 
person’s location was being physically tracked by a governmental 
officer. Obtaining few CSLI location points would not be a search 
under the Fourth Amendment, much like a police officer tailing a 
suspect’s vehicle for a few minutes would not be a search.138 Katz’s 
subjective element of the test should not be a part of this new test 
because Americans have widely inconsistent views about what 
information cell phone providers actually carry and the degree to 
which we expect the records to be private. The new test should 
account for how recent technologies are increasingly being 
incorporated into Americans’ daily lives along with how the same 
technology enables the government to intrude into people’s every day 
affairs without physically following an individual or searching items 
that are tangibly carried by that person. 
A new privacy test that can handle technological advances 
involving third parties like cellphone service companies and records 
of information could be as follows: 
A person has an expectation of privacy to information data 
(including information that the person jointly owns) when (1) the 
expectation is one that society should be prepared to recognize as 
reasonable and (2) the expectation is similar to the reasonable 
expectation of privacy regarding similar information data existing 
before the technology at issue was created. 
This test uses the broad term “information data” to account for all 
types of records and uses the term “jointly owns” because of Chief 
Justice Roberts’ views that cellphone records are a joint venture by 
the cellphone company and phone owner.139 The first element of the 
 
 136.  Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 896 (quoting United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780 (6th 
Cir. 2012)).  
 137.  Id. 
 138.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) 
(“[R]elatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets accords with 
expectations of privacy that our society has recognized as reasonable.”). 
 139.  See Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Drawing a Line on Privacy for Cellphone 
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test is derived from the Katz test but uses the word “should.” This is 
important since it would require a court to make a prescriptive claim 
about what information ought to be considered private. The second 
element would force courts to think about comparable information 
and their respective expectations of privacy before the technology at 
issue was developed. The Court would compare Petitioner’s CSLI 
data with being tracked by a GPS, albeit a less accurate one, over 127 
days. With the freedom to rule about how much the government can 
intrude into an individual’s daily affairs with and without a warrant, 
the Court can determine the line about how many CSLI location 
points constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment, but a 
bright-line rule is not necessary. The Court can set precedent that 
CSLI records over 127 days constitutes a search while admitting that 
they are not deciding the minimum for how many days and location 
points is always a search. The Court’s language should be carefully 
reasoned since it would guide how the lower courts approach 
technology and their respective privacy concerns for years to come. 
CONCLUSION 
Obtaining CSLI records for an extended period of time violates 
serious privacy concerns when an individual can be comprehensively 
tracked by their location data. In Carpenter, the Court should find that 
the Fourth Amendment protects this type of information that is 
disclosed to cellular companies and that requesting these documents 
is a search under the Fourth Amendment. A governmental entity 
should have to obtain a search warrant after showing probable cause 
in order to access these records. A new test that requires the Court to 
make prescriptive claims about expectations of privacy while 
comparing newer technologies with older technologies would account 
for these privacy concerns. 
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